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Procedural and institutional context
This Policy Brief outlines some aspects of the negotiations on the 
EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 (MFF) in the stage 
before the European Parliament’s consent (15 May, 2013). The MFF 
legislative package includes much more than just a list of allocati-
ons for each heading. Apart from the basic MFF regulation laying 
down categories and size of the expenditures, there are: the Inter-
institutional Agreement, five acts on the own resources system and 
seventy sector-specific legislative acts. In other words, the current 
negotiations cover budget revenues and expenditures, but also ge-
neral and sector-specific implementation rules, which are as impor-
tant as the figures and allocations alone. That is why the EP has all 
the more reason to remind us that the negotiation process was not 
over just by the successful conclusion of the meeting of the EU-27 
in February of this year. 
In this context it is noteworthy that several important changes in-
troduced to the procedures by the Treaty of Lisbon could play a role 
in the course and outcome of the negotiations. First, the ordinary 
legislative procedure has been extended and, as a consequence, 
the EP has more responsibility for the EU policies and legislation 
which have budgetary implications and create new expenditures. 
Not surprising then that it does not want to agree for more respon-
sibility with less resources. Second, while the financial perspective 
for 2007-2013 materialized as an Inter-institutional Agreement, the 
Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that the new MFF should be adopted in 
the form of a regulation and in accordance with the special legisla-
tive procedure requiring the consent of a majority of the EP mem-
bers and unanimity in the Council (article 312 paragraph 2). On the 
one hand, this procedure does not allow the EP to introduce amend-
ments to the regulation. On the other hand, the EP has the power 
The European Council meeting on 7 and 8 February 2013 attracted an unusual level of 
attention from media and citizens. For a couple 
of days, Europe played a more important role in 
national politics and news. Sensation-frenzied 
media and excited politicians spouted notions 
of ‘a battle’, ‘winners’, ‘losers’ or ‘striking deals’, 
as if Europe had gone back to the time when 
its military powers still conflicted. After more 
than 24 hours of intense negotiations, the 
respective Member States leaders left Brussels 
with ‘good news’ for their citizens. However, 
those with more Euro-federalist feelings were 
left with a sense of non-accomplishment 
and missed opportunities, not only because 
the EU budget for the first time in history 
was set for a net decrease, but also because 
the European Council’s conclusions did not 
contain any ground-breaking changes to this 
system. Nevertheless, the European Parliament 
(EP) immediately reminded Europe about its 
role and outlined its conditions for further 
negotiations. Thus, the supporters of a modern 
and stronger EU budget still see a chance in 
the consent procedure and hope to shift the 
focus of the debate from the juste retour spirit 
to the consideration of the European common 
good. Is there still a chance for such a shift? 
What issues are at stake?
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of vetoing the outcome of the Council’s negotiations. Therefore, 
without the EP’s consent the conclusions of the negotiations in 
the Council are nothing more than a political agreement. And in-
deed, the Parliament has been very active in the debate from the 
beginning and has been determined to take every formal and 
informal opportunity in order “to exercise its new powers to the 
full” (European Parliament, 2009). 
Size of the MFF: how to make sense of the Council decisions? 
   
Much has already been said about the overall size of the EU bud-
get and many different comparisons have been presented. For 
some the total amount of the MFF is high, for some small. No 
doubt that for the first time the overall expenditure limit of the 
MFF has been reduced compared to the previous MFF. Already 
in the Commission’s proposal (presented in June 2011) a de-
crease of the budget expressed in percentage of the EU GNI1 
from 1.12% in 2007-2013 to 1.05% in 2014-2020 had been fo-
reseen. Nevertheless, the Member States decided to decrease it 
even further to 1% of the EU GNI . This seems to indicate that, 
at least in terms of the budget’s size, the Member States value 
individual actions over EU common projects. However, at the oc-
casion of other summits the same Member States have adopted 
declarations of a completely opposite character. Thus, there is 
a mismatch between a number of projects that have been re-
cently agreed upon by the European Council and the tendency to 
limit the resources for their implementation. Examples of such 
commitments arising from the Treaty as well as from the Eu-
ropean Council’s decisions include: the ambitious goals of the 
Europe 2020 strategy, new tasks in the framework of the Euro-
pean External Action Service and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, financial assistance related to the crisis (i.e. the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the European Stability Me-
chanism) and implementation of  ‘The Compact for growth and 
jobs’.  Moreover, the Member States pledged to pursue large-
scale and expensive projects such as the ITER, Galileo and the 
European space policy.
The mismatch between the Member States’ commitments and 
the will to pay for them is also evident from the conflict that 
arose around the sum of outstanding bills in the EU budgets 
for 2012 and 2013 (€11.2bln)2. An agreement on this issue and 
a firm commitment by the Member States to cover the overall 
amount this year was a precondition for the Parliament to start 
the negotiations on the MFF. This problem illustrates somewhat 
contradictory behaviour of the heads of state. Their ambitious 
programmes and declarations do not mesh with the financial ca-
pabilities. The fact that they are reluctant to pay even for agreed 
commitments and a general aversion to transfers for the EU com-
mon wallet leads to a distorted image of the EU budget among 
citizens. It gives a signal that spending at the EU level does not 
produce any or little added value and contributes to a fundamen-
tal disbelief in EU policy management and in the positive role 
of the EU. Would such an outcome be in line with the Member 
States’ aspirations or expectations? 
Flexibility and duration: more democratic responsibility?
‘Flexibility’ has become one of the key words of the debate and 
the Parliament’s main demand in the negotiations with the Coun-
cil. It refers to different aspects of the MFF, such as the dura-
tion, the margins that are left for different resources and the 
spending ceiling, technical revisions (e.g. caused by inflation), 
reallocations of expenditures between years or headings, to the 
functioning of the special funds outside the MFF as well as to 
a possibility to recycle the surplus of the budget (which is now 
returned to the Member States).
As far as the MFF duration is concerned, Article 312 of the Lis-
bon Treaty states that the MFF shall be established for at least 
five years. In practice only the first long-term budget covered 
five years (1988-1992); all subsequent budgets lasted seven 
years. Although this aspect of the MFF may seem secondary, it 
has a political and practical significance. On the one hand, the 
five-year duration could easily be aligned to the EP and Commis-
sion mandates. There is no such synchronisation in the current, 
seven-year financial perspective. Therefore, the present EU insti-
tutions implement the budget that was negotiated and adopted 
during the previous term. In the EP’s words, “if no change is 
made to the timetable, some Parliaments will never be able to 
take fundamental budgetary decisions, since the financial frame-
work adopted by their predecessors covers the entire parliamen-
tary term in question” (European Parliament, 2009). On the other 
hand, longer and more predictable budgets are for the benefit of 
implementation of long-term projects and infrastructural invest-
ments. Taking this into account the Commission’s initial propo-
sal - presented in the Budget review in 2010 - covered a ten-year 
period with a substantial mid term review (‘5+5’). Certainly, this 
solution would allow for alignment of the MFF with the EU in-
stitutions mandate and increase their democratic responsibility 
and accountability. However, it would require a strong review 
clause in order to ensure the MFF flexibility and a possibility 
to react to new challenges that may occur in several years. But 
as experience shows, the Council reluctantly agrees to change 
sums once negotiated. Therefore, the same seven-year period 
has been eventually proposed by the Commission and accepted 
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by the Council. The Parliament called this a “transitional” solution 
and, in the light of a vague declaration of the European Council 
concerning any review, demanded a compulsory and comprehen-
sive mid-term revision of the MFF. 
The Parliament’s strong position on the flexibility of the budget 
has its roots in the experience of harsh discussions with the Coun-
cil about any adjustments to the amounts. Revisions are unavoida-
ble, yet under the current legislation it is very difficult to introduce 
them. They are strictly regulated and require a joint decision of 
the EP and the Council. Revising the budget by more than 0.03% 
of the EU GNI moreover requires unanimous consent from the 
Council3. One of the ways to avoid this troublesome procedure 
and exceeding fixed ceilings is to keep several special funds out-
side of the MFF. In the Council agreement from February 2013, 
the latter amount to 0.04% (which is higher when compared to 
the previous period) and include: European Aid Reserve, European 
Globalisation Fund, Solidarity Fund, Flexibility Instrument and Eu-
ropean Development Fund. Increasing these resources however, is 
questionable from the point of view of transparency of EU finan-
ces and procedures. On the one hand, these funds increase the 
financial means that are at the disposal of the EU institutions and 
allow them to react easier to unforeseen internal and external cir-
cumstances. On the other hand, they increase the Member States 
contribution, but being managed outside the MFF, they do not fall 
under the fully transparent and democratic procedures. 
In brief, budget flexibility in all its different aspects seems a cri-
tical element for finding an agreement between the EP and the 
Council. The outcome of the current negotiations should ensure 
the right balance between strict budgetary discipline, predictabi-
lity of expenditure and the flexibility needed to enable the Union 
to respond to unforeseen challenges. The overall goal of MFF flexi-
bility should be to ensure that the available resources are used to 
the full and that they bring the ambitioned European Added Value.
Structure: more transparency?
The MFF is presented in the form of a list of numbered headings 
and sub-headings. Its structure matters because it is a powerful 
communication tool about EU priorities. Therefore, in order to 
increase the visibility of the EU political priorities the structure 
was reshuffled and renamed each time a new multiannual finan-
cial plan was adopted. The most radical modification was intro-
duced in the MFF for 2007-2013 when straightforward titles such 
as “Agriculture” and “Structural operations” were replaced by hea-
dings that were more aligned with the Lisbon Strategy, but at the 
same time less clear, like “Preservation and Management of Natu-
ral Resources” and “Sustainable Growth”. Similarly, the headings of 
the MFF for 2014-2020 express the goals of the Europe 2020 stra-
tegy, i.e. “Smart and Inclusive Growth” or “Sustainable Growth: Na-
tural resources”. While these changes introduce some ‘key words’ 
and ensure political visibility of EU priorities, they are unclear and 
less transparent for the average citizen. This added to the general 
complexity of the MFF makes it very difficult for the average citi-
zen to grasp the value added the EU budget could provide.
Own resources: any changes?
Similar allegations concerning a lack of transparency and com-
plexity also concern the revenue side of the MFF. For a long time 
the system for calculating and collecting Member States’ contri-
butions to the EU budget has been criticised for its rebates and 
excessive dependency on national payments. Although the treaty 
states that the EU budget should be financed wholly from own re-
sources (article 311 of the TFEU), and the Parliament hand in hand 
with the Commission call for an in-depth reform of the revenue 
system, the Council as a whole resists radical changes. And this 
is despite the fact that the reform proposal submitted last year by 
the Commission would not change the size of the budget; it would 
decrease national contributions based on GNI from 80% to 60% of 
the EU budget revenues. Whereas the European Council conclusion 
of 8 February 2013 suggests that there may be an agreement on 
a new VAT-related own resource, the perspectives for a financial 
transaction tax are not promising. A positive decision on budget 
reform in this sense is very unlikely, as it requires unanimity in the 
Council and ratification by all Member States. Some of the latter 
present a very rigid position against any EU-tax. Some hope for 
change resides however with the Parliament’s right to veto a regu-
lation laying down implementing measures for the own resources 
system, and with its increasing cooperation with the national par-
liaments in this matter. 
Conclusion
Despite more than two years of intensive debates, the three EU 
institutions have not agreed on any profound changes concerning 
duration, structure, flexibility or revenues for the MFF. There is 
a real danger that the EU will miss out on an important chance 
to reform and will enter the next financial period with a budget 
that is “a historical relic” in which “expenditures, revenues and 
procedures are all inconsistent with the present and future state 
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of EU integration” (Sapir, 2003). No doubt that while the Council 
is internally divided and unable to agree on any step forward, 
the drive for reform should come from the Commission, the Eu-
ropean and national parliaments and, last but not least, from 
common sense with the EU citizens. To achieve this, the focus of 
all stakeholders (including the media) should dramatically shift 
from arguments over the budget size of 1.0% or 1.01% of the 
EU GNI to proposals on systems raising own budget resources, 
mechanisms ensuring budget flexibility and possibility to react 
to unforeseen challenges as well as creating more effective spen-
ding, such as project bonds or the European Growth Fund (Mar-
zinotto, 2012). We should all realise that the EU budget is small 
compared to its announced objectives and its intervention beco-
mes economically significant only if it is reinforced by national 
(private and public) expenditure at each level, national, regional 
and local (Sapir, 2003). Moreover, whereas the issues that are at 
stake at this stage of the negotiations are more complex than 
the overall size of the MFF, they are particularly significant for 
a smooth, efficient and successful implementation of the MFF. 
If the Parliament and the Member States are able to agree some 
radical changes in the EU financial system, the result may help to 
do more with less in Europe in the next decade. 
Notes
1The actual annual expenditures of the MFF have never reached the 
agreed ceilings.
2Budgets Committee backs two-track approach to talks on unpaid 
bills and the MFF, 7.05.2013. (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/
en/pressroom/content/20130506IPR08019/html/Budgets-Committee-
backs-two-track-approach-to-talks-on-unpaid-bills-and-the-MFF)  
[Accessed: 13.05.2013]
3Apart from the annual technical adjustments, the amounts of the 
current financial framework have been amended seven times since it has 
come into force. Each amendment was made to find financial resources to 
face unforeseen expenses, such as  increased spending for Galileo in 2007 
or for ITER in 2010, and led to intensive inter-institutional arguments.
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